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KSR: HAVE GENE PATENTS BEEN KO’D? 
THE NON-OBVIOUSNESS DETERMINATION OF 
PATENTS CLAIMING NUCLEOTIDE SEQUENCES 
WHEN THE PRIOR ART HAS ALREADY 
DISCLOSED THE AMINO ACID SEQUENCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the fields of biotechnology and recombinant DNA have grown, so 
has the interest in biotechnology patents. One need only look to the 
financial potential of biotechnology patents to see one reason for this 
interest. For example, Amgen is the owner of a patent on the human 
erythropoietin1 gene, and utilizes this patent to produce a synthetic version 
of erythropoietin called Epogen.2 Sales of Epogen reached $2.5 billion in 
2005.3 Although there is no doubt that advances in biotechnology have 
aided the health and welfare of society, there remain many legal and 
economic, as well as ethical and moral,4 concerns regarding the 
patentability of biotechnology inventions.  
In theory, the basic patent requirements apply in the same manner to 
biotechnology inventions as to any other invention. However, many 
commentators believe that the Federal Circuit5 has applied these 
requirements differently to different technologies, particularly 
 
 
 1. Erythropoeitin is a protein which plays a role in red blood cell production and can be used in 
the treatment of anemia. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., No. 87-2617-Y, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16110, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 11, 1989), aff’d in part, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 2. Andrew Pollack, Kidney Dialysis Center Deal With Amgen Blocks Roche, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2006, at C4. See also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(describing two patents claiming a method of preparing erythropoietin and the DNA sequence 
encoding the gene for erythropoietin). 
 3. Pollack, supra note 2, at C4. 
 4. See generally OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINTS AND 
PATENT LAW (2005); DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA 
PATENTING (2004) (discussing the moral arguments against certain biotechnology and DNA related 
patents). For a discussion of the moral and ethical arguments against the patenting of transgenic 
animals, see Carrie F. Walter, Note, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent Practice and the 
Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. L.J. 1025, 1040–45 (1998). 
 5. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents the merger of the Court 
of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. David J. Meador, Origin of the Federal 
Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 581, 592 (1992). The new court had jurisdiction over 
cases previously heard by the two merged courts. Id. The Federal Circuit, officially created in 1982, 
also has jurisdiction over appeals from patent cases originally brought in federal district court. Sean M. 
McEldowney, Comment, The “Essential Relationship” Spectrum: A Framework for Addressing 
Choice of Procedural Law in the Federal Circuit, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1642 (2005). 
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biotechnology.6 One of the most currently contentious areas of patent law 
is the non-obviousness requirement. This requirement ensures that patents 
will only be awarded to those inventors who contribute subject matter that 
would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the inventor’s 
art or industry. Some believe that the Federal Circuit has in fact “bent over 
backwards” to find biotechnology patents non-obvious.7  
One area of biotechnology that particularly concerns many 
commentators is gene patents, or patents attempting to claim a DNA or 
nucleotide sequence.8 Current law does not allow the patenting of 
naturally occurring genes; however, a patent can be granted for an isolated 
and purified version of a gene.9 Approximately twenty percent of human 
 
 
 6. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 691, 691 (2004) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle] 
(“Thus, as a practical matter, it appears that, although patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is 
technology-specific in application.”); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law 
Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156–57 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Is 
Patent Law Technology-Specific?] (discussing how the Federal Circuit’s perception of the level of 
unpredictability in biotechnology does not accurately reflect current standings and results in a relaxed 
obviousness standard and more stringent enablement and written description requirements); Janice M. 
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological 
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 613, 633 (1998) (arguing that the Federal Circuit created a 
“super-enablement” standard for biotechnological inventions by requiring that the original, rather than 
the presented or amended, claims meet the written description standard and by holding that the written 
description requirement for DNA claims cannot be satisfied without disclosure of the specific 
nucleotide sequence); Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written 
Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1233, 1240, 1253–54 (2000) (arguing that while generally an inventor may rely on the patent 
application filing date as a constructive reduction to practice, the Federal Circuit has prevented this in 
biotechnology and has required a more stringent written description requirement due to the 
unpredictability of the field hypothetically preventing conception of the invention). 
 7. Burk & Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, supra note 6, at 1156. The requirement 
of non-obviousness is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103. An inventor may not obtain a patent if the invention 
would be obvious at the time of the invention to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the 
invention pertains. See infra Part II.B.1; see also Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, Comment, A Higher Non-
obviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 165 (2000) (pointing out that the number of biotechnology patents issued 
between 1990 and 1998 quadrupled while the total number of patents issued during that time only 
increased by sixty percent and proposing that this disparity is caused by a more relaxed non-
obviousness standard applied to the biotechnology industry). But see Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 911, 914 (2007) (concluding after an empirical study of Federal Circuit non-
obviousness cases that the non-obviousness requirement has not been relaxed in recent years and may 
actually be more stringently applied by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)).  
 8. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.821(a) (2005) ( “Nucleotide and/or amino acid sequences . . . are 
interpreted to mean an unbranched sequence of four or more amino acids or an unbranched sequence 
of ten or more nucleotides.”). 
 9. A patent applicant cannot claim that which is naturally occurring, such as a gene in its natural 
form. However, an applicant can claim a purified and isolated form of the gene or the protein which it 
creates. See Varu Chilakamarri, Structural Nonobviousness: How Inventiveness is Lost in the 
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genes are already the subjects of United States patents.10 Of particular 
concern are those patents attempting to claim a gene encoding a protein 
when the amino acid sequence of that protein has already been disclosed in 
the prior art.11 The nature of the genetic code—the predictable relationship 
between DNA and amino acids12—fuels the argument that if the amino 
acid sequence is known, the underlying DNA sequence would be obvious 
to a person of ordinary skill in the field of biotechnology.13 Amino acids 
are the building blocks of proteins. For each individual amino acid, there 
are a limited number of DNA sequences that encode for that specific 
amino acid. Therefore, when a protein has a known amino acid sequence, 
the underlying gene can only have a limited number of possible DNA 
sequences. Thus, some would argue that the underlying DNA sequence is 
obvious and therefore unpatentable. 
Conversely, there is legitimate concern that withdrawing patent 
protection for such DNA sequences due to obviousness would lead to a 
chilling effect on related biotechnology research efforts.14 However, these 
concerns must be viewed in light of the goals of patent law. The merits of 
encouraging biotechnological research should not trump patent law’s 
axiomatic prerogative to offer protection only to non-obvious 
contributions.15  
 
 
Discovery, VA. J.L. & TECH. Vol. 10, No. 7, ¶ 3 (Summer 2005), available at http://www.vjolt.net/ 
vol10/issue3/v10i3_a7-Chilakamarri.pdf (providing the example that adrenaline in an isolated form is 
patentable because it is not found in nature in this state). For a discussion of inventions versus 
discoveries and how the non-obviousness requirement is applied to each, see generally id.  
 10. Stefan Lovgren, One-Fifth of Human Genes Have Been Patented, Study Reveals, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Oct. 13, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/22064243.html. 
 11. Prior art refers to “[k]nowledge that is publicly known, used by others, or available on the 
date of invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art, including what would be obvious from that 
knowledge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (8th ed. 2004). Prior art can include things such as 
previous patents, scientific journal articles, or academic theses. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. Under patent law, protection is unavailable for obvious inventions. See infra note 77.  
 14. See Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 
2983166, at *2 (arguing that if new biotechnology patents will be vulnerable to obviousness rejections 
under a new standard, future research and innovation would be hampered by a reduction in 
investments). But see Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 7, at 144–45 (discussing a chilling effect on the 
biotechnological industry resulting from the public’s potential boycott of donating genetic samples for 
research and the “bureaucratic red tape” which could result if the Federal Circuit does not strengthen 
the non-obviousness standard); Anna Bartow Laakmann, Restoring the Genetic Commons: A 
“Common Sense” Approach to Biotechnology Patents in the Wake of KSR v. Teleflex, 14 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 45 (2007) (“Despite general consensus that patents are necessary to 
the vitality of the biopharmaceutical industry, there are substantial concerns that gene patents slow the 
pace of scientific advancement and deter commercial development of basic genomics research.”). 
 15. Another concern supporting the argument for raising the obviousness standard is the filing of 
so-called irresponsible gene patents. Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 7, at 169. These are patents 
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At present, the Federal Circuit’s generous extension of patent 
protection to biotechnology inventions, such as genes and nucleotide 
sequences, stands on tenuous footing with the principles of American 
patent law—that only non-obvious inventions should be protected. This 
tension invokes the need for a new approach to biotechnology patents that 
promotes the progress of science while adhering to the traditional limits of 
the law. Although a legislative approach may sound appealing, in reality 
such an approach would be inadequate.16 As a field, biotechnology is 
advancing and changing too rapidly for a legislative amendment to be 
flexible enough to adequately address the issues of obviousness in 
biotechnology patents.17  
However, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in KSR v. 
Teleflex18 presents one potential solution.19 In KSR, the Court altered how 
the applicable tests for obviousness, the Graham factors and the teaching-
suggestion-motivation test,20 interact.21 Instead of strictly requiring some 
type of teaching, suggestion, or motivation to find an invention obvious, 
the Court referred to this test as merely a “helpful insight” into the 
Graham factors.22  
While the patent at issue in KSR was unrelated to biotechnology, the 
law subjects patents from every technology to the same obviousness 
requirement.23 Thus, application of the principles announced in KSR to 
biotechnology could provide an opening for the Federal Circuit to redefine 
its approach to patents for DNA sequences when the amino acid sequence 
 
 
claiming hundreds of partial DNA sequences without the patent applicant knowing any associated 
functions. Id. 
 16. Such an approach was suggested in February 2007 by Congressmen Xavier Becerra and 
Dave Weldon. Laakmann, supra note 14, at 45 (citing H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007)). The 
Congressmen “introduced the Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, which would amend the U.S. 
Patent Code to prohibit patents for ‘a nucleotide sequence, or its functions and correlations, or the 
naturally occurring products it specifies.’” Id. 
 17. See also Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 841–42 (1999) (listing several problems with a legislative 
approach to dealing with the non-obviousness standard, including the influence of special interest 
groups on the political process, burdensome administrative costs, and the potential inability to deal 
with future developments in the biotechnology field). 
 18. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). See infra Part III.A. 
 19. However, some commentators believe that KSR leaves “the law of obviousness . . . in a state 
of uncertainty and flux.” Harold C. Wegner, Chemical and Biotechnology Obviousness in a State of 
Flux, 26 BIOTECH. L. REP. 437, 437 (2008).  
 20. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 21. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739–43.  
 22. Id. at 1741. See infra text accompanying note 192. 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
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of the protein is known.24 The Federal Circuit’s current case law follows 
the principle that even where the prior art discloses the full amino acid 
sequence of a protein, the DNA sequence of the underlying gene is non-
obvious and therefore patentable.25 Given the continual progress of 
biotechnology and the increased understanding of genetics, the Federal 
Circuit’s approach to patents claiming DNA sequences is no longer viable. 
KSR called for a more common sense and flexible approach to the non-
obvious determination.  
I will argue that KSR’s new approach should result in bringing the non-
obvious determination for biotechnology inventions in line with the 
current expertise in the field. This can be achieved by finding that patents 
claiming the nucleotide sequence of a gene when the full amino acid 
sequence of the protein encoded by the gene has already been disclosed 
are obvious over the prior art. Part II of this Note provides a brief 
overview of modern DNA technology, discusses the requirement of non-
obviousness in patent law and the appropriate test, and describes two 
controlling applications of the appropriate test in the Federal Circuit. Part 
III reviews KSR v. Teleflex and studies how the Supreme Court applied the 
non-obviousness test therein. Part III also discusses how KSR has been 
applied by the Federal Circuit. Finally, Part IV argues that KSR demands a 
reversal of how the Federal Circuit has previously applied the non-
obviousness requirement to gene patents claiming a DNA sequence when 
the amino acid sequence of the protein encoded by the gene is already 
known. Ultimately, I conclude that the application of KSR to such patents 
should lead to a determination of obviousness when the full amino acid 
sequence has been disclosed in the prior art. 
II. THE PATENTING OF DNA 
A. Overview of DNA and Gene Patents 
Biotechnology has grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades. 
Previously unthinkable genetically-modified organisms and genes are now 
the commonplace content of patent applications. Understanding how the 
Federal Circuit has treated biotechnology patents in relation to the 
 
 
 24. For a globally based discussion of obviousness in relation to nucleic acid molecules, see Amy 
Nelson, Obviousness or Inventive Step as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules: A Global Perspective, 6 
N.C.J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004). 
 25. See infra Part II.C. 
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requirement of non-obviousness requires a brief overview of the structure 
of DNA and the relationship between DNA, amino acids, and proteins. 
DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, contains an organism’s genetic 
information.26 Four different nucleotides link together to form strands of 
DNA, and two strands of DNA combine to form a stable double helix.27 
The four possible nucleotides in DNA are adenine (A), guanine (G), 
cytosine (C), and thymine (T).28 When two strands of DNA form a double 
helix, each nucleotide on one strand forms a bond with a specific 
nucleotide on the complementary strand.29 Adenine and thymine will 
usually form a bond, as will guanine and cytosine.30 This is called base 
pairing. For example, if one strand of DNA contains the nucleotide 
sequence of AATGCA, the complementary strand that will bind to this 
portion of the DNA will contain the predictable sequence of TTACGT. 
The term gene refers to a section of DNA base pairs that encodes a 
protein.31 The process of creating a protein from the DNA of a gene 
involves transcription and translation.32 Transcription refers to the process 
of making a copy of the gene portion of the template DNA strand.33 This 
copy is usually made up of mRNA, or messenger ribonucleic acid.34 
Translation refers to the process conducted by the cellular mechanism 
called the ribosome35 which involves assembling amino acids into a 
protein according to the mRNA’s copy of the gene portion of the template 
DNA.36  
Each sequence of three nucleotides in the RNA or DNA acts as a code 
for an amino acid to be added to the protein being formed at the 
ribosome.37 With four possible nucleotides, there are sixty-four possible 
 
 
 26. KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 18 (1995). Additional 
background information on molecular biology can be found in In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 895–99 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) and BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL Part II (3d ed. 
1994). 
 27. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 18. 
 28. Id. 
 29. ALBERTS, supra note 26, at 99.  
 30. Id. Adenine and thymine, as well as guanine and cytosine, are referred to as complimentary 
base pairs due to this relationship. Id. This relationship is due in part to the number of bonds which 
form between the two nucleotides during the formation of the double helix. Id. 
 31. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 18. It is estimated that the human genome consists of three 
billion nucleotide base pairs with as many as 100,000 possible genes. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 18–19. 
 35. A ribosome is an organelle contained within cells which link up with the messenger RNA 
and synthesize the protein. ALBERTS, supra note 26, at G-20. 
 36. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 19. 
 37. Id. 
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sets of three-nucleotide sequences, which are called codons;38 however, 
there are only twenty different amino acids.39 This results in what is 
known as the degeneracy of the genetic code.40 Some amino acids can only 
be encoded for by one possible codon, called unique codons, while other 
amino acids can be encoded for by up to six different codons.41 It is 
important to note that while a single amino acid can result from several 
different codons, no single codon can result in more than one amino acid. 
To put this into a concrete example, while the amino acid alanine results 
from any of the codons GCU, GCC, GCA, or GCG, any of these codons in 
a strand of mRNA will only result in alanine being added to the building 
protein. 
During translation, the ribosome reads the mRNA sequences and 
begins building a protein by linking amino acids together.42 The ribosome 
moves along the mRNA, reading each codon in sequence and adding the 
appropriate amino acid, translating the genetic code.43 Once the entire 
strand of mRNA has been read and translated into amino acids, a protein 
has been created.44  
Recombinant DNA techniques have been used to create micro-
organisms that produce useful proteins.45 For example, once the DNA 
sequence of a human gene is known, it can be inserted into the DNA of a 
bacterium.46 Since all organisms follow the same genetic code, the 
bacterium will be able to transcribe the human DNA sequence and 
produce a human protein.47 
Biotechnology can also be used to isolate specific genes.48 While there 
are several different methods for isolating a gene, I will briefly describe 
one such method. The first step in isolating a human gene is to break down 
 
 
 38. The term codon simply refers to any triplet of nucleotides. ALBERTS, supra note 26, at 106. 
 39. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 19. 
 40. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Additionally, there are three possible 
codons which do not encode an amino acid, but rather act to signal the end of a gene. These are known 
as the stop codons. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 19. The beginning of a gene is always signaled by 
one codon, which encodes the amino acid methionine. Id. 
 41. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783 n.5. 
 42. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 19.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1988). One example of a useful protein is 
insulin. Id. 
 46. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 19. See also O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 898 (reviewing the process 
of transformation, when a bacterium integrates foreign genetic material into its own DNA). 
 47. BURCHFIEL, supra note 26, at 19.  
 48. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., ESSENTIAL CELL BIOLOGY 327 (1998). 
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the entire human genome into smaller pieces.49 Mechanical shearing, or 
enzymes known as restriction endonucleases, are used to create small 
DNA fragments from the entire genome.50 This collection of DNA pieces 
representing the genome is known as a DNA library.51 The next step in 
finding the specific gene being sought requires a DNA probe.52 A probe is 
created once a portion of the protein has been sequenced, providing a short 
amino acid sequence.53 Using the genetic code, a DNA probe is created, 
containing the DNA sequence encoding that amino acid sequence.54 The 
DNA probe can then be introduced to the DNA library, where it will 
hybridize, or bond, with the DNA fragment containing that sequence.55 
Once this location is known, the surrounding DNA can be isolated and 
sequenced to produce the full DNA sequence encoding the protein in 
question.56 
Current estimates place the number of genes in the human genome at 
approximately 20,000–25,000.57 Once genes have been identified and 
isolated, they can be patented.58 While the patentability of genes was 
questioned originally, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
issued official guidelines in 2001 which laid those questions to rest.59 The 
Guidelines stated affirmatively that genes were patentable subject matter, 
so long as the invention satisfied the requirements of the Patent Act.60 The 
Patent and Trademark Office stated that “an inventor’s discovery of a gene 
can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition isolated from its 
natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene 
from other molecules naturally associated with it.”61 Since things cannot 
be patented in a form that occurs in nature, the additional steps of isolating 
and purifying the gene aid the invention in overcoming an initial hurdle to 
 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 327–28. 
 51. Id. at 328. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 328–29. 
 55. Id. at 329. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Malcolm Ritter, Scientists rein in estimate on human genome, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2004, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/genetics/2004-10-20-fewer-genes-needed_x.htm. 
By comparison, one species of roundworm has approximately 19,500 genes and a flowering plant has 
approximately 27,000. Id. 
 58. See supra note 9. 
 59. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 60. See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 61. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
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patentability.62 However, disclosure of only an isolated and purified 
nucleotide sequence is not sufficient to obtain a patent.63 The inventor 
must disclose a “specific, substantial, and credible utility for the claimed 
isolated and purified gene” in order to be awarded a patent.64 Both the 
sequence and the potential use of the sequence must be disclosed. 
A recent study found that approximately twenty percent of all human 
genes were claimed in U.S. patents as of 2005.65 Gene patents can prove to 
be invaluable in developing diagnostic tests, researching genetic therapy 
techniques, and numerous other applications. While the possibility of 
obtaining a patent acts as a powerful incentive in genetic research, the 
award of a gene patent can create problems for future researchers. For 
example, a patent claiming a gene can effectively block downstream 
research on applications of that gene.66 This is the precise situation 
occurring with two breast cancer genes.67 Myriad Genetics holds patents 
on BRCA1 and BRCA2.68 These patents have allowed Myriad to prevent 
the use of these genes in research and in developing new tests for 
diagnosing breast cancer based on the presence of the genes.69 
 
 
 62. Id. The Guidelines specifically provide: 
An isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring 
gene is eligible for a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as a 
composition of matter or as an article of manufacture because that DNA molecule does not 
occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for 
patents because their purified state is different from the naturally occurring compound. 
Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Lovgren, supra note 10. 
 66. Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 1, 50 (2005). For a more thorough discussion of the potential problems of downstream 
research when there is a broad grant of upstream gene patents, see generally Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCI. 698 (1998) and Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: 
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001). 
 67. Aljalian, supra note 66, at 53. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 53–54. Myriad does offer a diagnostic test based on the two patented BRCA genes, but 
charges up to $3,000 for the test. Myriad Genetic Launches Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Breast 
Cancer Gene Test in Northeastern Cities, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.medical 
newstoday.com/articles/82147.php. Additionally, Myriad requires that all such diagnostic testing occur 
at Myriad facilities. May Mowzoon, Comment, Access Versus Incentive: Balancing Policies in 
Genetic Patents, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1077, 1093 (2003). This situation brings up many of the moral 
issues in the debate about biotechnology patents which are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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B. Non-obviousness Requirement of Patent Law 
1. Origination and Codification of 35 U.S.C. § 103 
In order to be awarded patent protection, the patent examiner must 
believe that the invention is useful, new, and non-obvious.70 While the 
general patentability requirement of utility was included in the 
Constitution71 and both utility and novelty were included in the Patent Act 
of 1793,72 it was not until 195273 that Congress added the requirement of 
non-obviousness.74 The idea of requiring an invention to be non-obvious 
originated in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.75 There, the Supreme Court stated: 
[F]or unless more ingenuity and skill in applying [the claimed 
improvement invention] than were possessed by an ordinary 
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that 
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of 
every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the 
skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.76 
Although this idea remained consistently within the case law, it was not 
codified until the 1952 Patent Act when Congress added § 103, entitled 
“Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.”77 The Supreme 
 
 
 70. See 35 U.S.C § 101 (2000) (containing the new and useful requirements); 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(2000) (containing the non-obvious requirement). 
 71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries;”) (emphasis added); see also Steven P. Smith & Kurt R. Van Thomme, Bridge Over 
Troubled Water: The Supreme Court’s New Patent Obviousness Standard in KSR Should Be Readily 
Apparent and Benefit the Public, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 127, 148 (2007) (discussing the 
Constitutional policy of promoting the useful arts behind the patent clause). 
 72. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, repealed by Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 21 5 
Stat. 117, 125. 
 73. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-351 
(2000)). 
 74. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (discussing the history of the non-
obviousness requirement). 
 75. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 11 
(discussing the history of Hotchkiss and the origin of the non-obviousness requirement). 
 76. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267. 
 77. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Section 103 provides: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as 
set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious 
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the 
invention was made. 
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Court first addressed the application of the non-obviousness requirement 
in Graham v. John Deere Co.78 and set forth a four-prong test of 
obviousness.79 When analyzing obviousness, the court inquires into (1) the 
scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art 
and the claimed invention; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the relevant 
art;80 and (4) secondary considerations such as commercial success, long-
felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others.81 The Graham factors have 
continued to play an important role in how courts determine 
obviousness.82 
2. Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation Test 
In addition to utilizing the Graham factors, the Federal Circuit applies 
a two-part test when making a determination of obviousness: (1) there 
must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation (“TSM”) to combine the 
prior art to arrive at the claimed invention; and (2) there must have been a 
 
 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). Section 103(b) relates to the non-obviousness of biotechnological 
processes. 35 U.S.C. §103(b) (2000). See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 14–15 (“An invention which has 
been made, and which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not 
be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known before is not considered 
sufficiently great to warrant a patent.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 6 (1952)). 
 78. 383 U.S. 1. 
 79. Id. at 17–18. 
 80. Id. at 17. Determining this level of skill requires imagining a hypothetical person having 
ordinary skill in the art, also known as a “PHOSITA.” DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
PATENT LAW 621 (2004). 
 81. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. See also Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 14, at 27 (discussing the Graham factors and explaining 
the secondary considerations). 
[C]ommercial success of an invention . . . suggests it was nonobvious or else someone would 
have developed it earlier as an obvious means of further profit from the prior art. A long felt 
unsolved need in an area similarly suggests that an invention that comes along to meet the 
need was nonobvious or else others would have long ago developed it. And, the failure of 
others, of course, serves as a strong objective indication that an invention was not obvious or 
else others would not have met failure when they tried to develop it. 
Id. In Graham, the Court noted that there would be inevitable difficulties in applying the test, but only 
difficulties similar in magnitude to those already faced by courts. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. The Court 
recognized that the varying factual contexts would not be easily amenable to a uniform decision on 
obviousness. Id. However, the Court also emphasized the primary role of the USPTO, and not the 
courts, in making the initial determination of obviousness. Id. At the time of the decision, the Court 
believed that the new obviousness test would “expedite disposition” within the USPTO and “bring 
about a closer concurrence between administrative and judicial precedent.” Id. at 18–19. Contra Brief 
of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *4, KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), No. 04-1350, 2006 WL 2452369 (arguing that the Federal 
Circuit’s approach of requiring such a factual inquiry of obviousness impairs the USPTO’s ability to 
utilize the expertise of the patent examiners in determining obviousness). 
 82. See Smith & Van Thomme, supra note 71, at 158–92 (reviewing the jurisprudence regarding 
the Graham factors and their application).  
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reasonable expectation of success in combining the prior art.83 TSM comes 
into play in evaluating the first Graham factor: the scope and content of 
the prior art.84 An evaluation of the prior art considers “[w]hat the prior art 
teaches, whether it teaches away from the claimed invention, and whether 
it motivates a combination of teachings from different references.”85 
Simply finding each individual element of the claimed invention in the 
prior art is not sufficient on its own to invalidate the claimed invention.86 
TSM requires the additional step of providing an articulated reason for 
combining the individual elements found in the prior art in a way to arrive 
at the claimed invention.87 Regardless of whether the teaching, suggestion, 
or motivation to combine those individual elements is found explicitly or 
implicitly in the prior art, the patent examiner still must show a specific 
rationale for making the combination.88 Additionally, there must be a 
reasonable expectation of success that combining the prior art references 
will result in the claimed invention.89 
A review of two cases decided in the last ten years demonstrates the 
possible extremes of the TSM test. In 1999, the Federal Circuit reviewed 
the obviousness of a patent for the now popular-plastic garbage bags 
decorated with a Halloween pumpkin face in In re Dembiczak.90 The court 
reviewed several pieces of prior art, including two design patents for a bag 
with a pumpkin face,91 a book for teaching children to make a “paper bag 
 
 
 83. Dystar Textilfarben GMBH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). But see Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 81, at 9–10 (pointing out that the TSM test does not originate from either Section 103 
specifically or anywhere else in the Patent Act and arguing that if the Supreme Court had utilized TSM 
in Graham, an opposite result may have occurred). 
 84. Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1363. TSM does not supplant any part of the Graham factors, but is 
intended to act as a guide in evaluating the four factors. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. 
 85. Dystar. 464 F.3d at 1363 (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1199–1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 86. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).  
 87. Id. This requirement remains regardless of whether the elements of the claimed invention are 
found in a single piece of prior art or throughout several prior art references. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1371 (“[P]articular findings must be made as to the reason the skilled artisan, with no 
knowledge of the claimed invention, would have selected these components for combination in the 
manner claimed.”). Cf. Steven J. Lee & Jeffrey M. Butler, Teaching, Suggestion and Motivation: KSR 
v. Teleflex and the Chemical Arts, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 915, 922 (2007) 
(arguing that this stringent requirement of the TSM test acts as a shield for patents which have already 
been issued and also lowers the patentability requirement for new patent applications). 
 89. Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1360. See also In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-4 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(pointing out that this second prong of TSM does not require an absolute prediction of success in 
creating the claimed invention, just a reasonable expectation of success). 
 90. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 91. Id. at 997. These design patents, also owned by the patent applicants in this case, presented 
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pumpkin” by decorating the bag to make it look like a pumpkin and 
stuffing it with newspapers, and common plastic garbage bags.92 The 
Board had affirmed the patent examiner’s rejection based on obviousness 
over the prior art.93 The court began its analysis by reviewing the Graham 
factors and emphasizing the danger of falling into a hindsight bias in the 
obviousness determination.94 According to the court, the best way to 
defend against a hindsight-driven obviousness analysis is a “rigorous 
application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation 
to combine prior art references.”95 The court cited a laundry list of cases 
supporting this proposition.96 The court continued to say that TSM could 
be found in the prior art, the knowledge of a PHOSITA,97 or the nature of 
the problem being solved by the claimed invention.98 Notwithstanding a 
seemingly expansive view of TSM, the court again emphasized the 
requirement of a clear and particular showing of “actual evidence.”99 
Despite the simple nature of the invention and the numerous prior art 
references, the lack of “particular findings” was, in the court’s opinion, 
fatal to the Board’s finding of obviousness.100 Although the Board found 
each limitation present in the patent claims in the prior art references, the 
 
 
an issue of obviousness-type double patenting. Id. at 998. While such issues are beyond the scope of 
this Note, it is important to point out that the Federal Circuit dealt with the double patenting issue 
separately, ultimately reversing the original rejection on this ground. Id. at 1003.  
 92. Id. at 997. 
 93. Id. at 997–98. 
 94. Id. at 998–99. Hindsight bias describes the tendency of a patent examiner or a judge, when 
reviewing an invention for obviousness, to look at the invention and the prior art from the current 
perspective rather than the perspective at the time the invention was created. The court emphasized the 
importance and difficulty of preventing hindsight bias, stating that the obviousness determination 
“requires the oft-difficult but critical step of casting the mind back to the time of invention, to consider 
the thinking of one of ordinary skill in the art, guided only by the prior art references and the then-
accepted wisdom in the field.” Id. at 999. See Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: 
Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. 
& TECH. 1 (2006) for discussion of a study on how well the Federal Circuit’s teaching-suggestion-
motivation test eliminates hindsight bias. 
 95. Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999 (emphasis added). See also Brief of Biotechnology Industry 
Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 14, at 18 (arguing that the 
Federal Circuit’s requirement of “specific proof” of TSM is “essential to the predictability of 
patentability” and at the same time remains “flexible” since the proof of TSM does not need to be 
expressly written in a prior art reference). 
 96. Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), In re Rouffet 149 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1998), In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 
(Fed. Cir. 1992), In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta 
Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 97. A PHOSITA is a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art. See supra note 80. 
 98. Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1000. 
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Board failed to make specific findings as to where TSM to combine the 
references was actually found.101 The Federal Circuit ultimately reversed 
the Board’s obviousness rejection.102 
On the other side of the spectrum is the Federal Circuit’s application of 
TSM in DyStar Textilfarben GMBH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co.103 At issue 
was DyStar’s patented process for dying textiles.104 Throughout its 
opinion, the Federal Circuit refuted the characterization of TSM as 
strict.105 The court additionally stated that while TSM is generally 
discussed in relation to the scope and content of the prior art (the first 
Graham factor), TSM is also linked to the level of skill in the art (the third 
Graham factor).106 When the level of skill of a person having ordinary 
skill in the art is low, a more substantial showing of some TSM to 
combine the prior art is required.107 When the level of skill is higher, a 
lesser showing is required.108 The court first had to determine whether the 
appropriate level of skill was a dyer who had no knowledge of chemistry 
 
 
 101. Id. The court stated, “this reference-by-reference, limitation-by-limitation analysis fails to 
demonstrate how the [prior art] references teach or suggest their combination with the conventional 
trash or lawn bags to yield the claimed invention.” Id. 
 102. Id. at 1003. 
 103. 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006). One significant aspect of this decision was the fact that it 
was handed down after certiorari was granted in KSR. This indicated that the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Dystar was written with an eye toward how the Supreme Court would review recent applications of 
TSM. See Clara R. Cottrell, Note, The Supreme Court Brings a Sea Change With KSR International 
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 595, 614 (2007) (pointing out that the Federal 
Circuit’s stance in Dystar was a shot at “damage control” over the court’s previous applications of 
TSM). 
 104. Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1358. 
 105. See id. at 1361 (“In contrast to the characterization of some commentators, the suggestion 
test is not a rigid categorical rule.”); id. at 1365 (“[Prior cases] correctly applie[d] the suggestion test 
and by no means require[d] an explicit teaching to combine to be found in a particular prior art 
reference.”); id. at 1367 (“It is difficult to see how our suggestion test could be seen as rigid and 
categorical given the myriad cases over several decades in which panels of this court have applied the 
suggestion test flexibly.”); id. at 1367 (“Our suggestion test is actually quite flexible and not only 
permits, but requires consideration of common knowledge and common sense.”); id. at 1368 
(“Because the desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is 
universal—and even common-sensical—we have held that there exists in these situations a motivation 
to combine prior art references even absent any hint of suggestion in the references themselves.”). The 
court appeared to back as far away as possible from its previous requirement of a specific showing of 
some suggestion to combine prior art references by stating that when improving a product or process, 
“the proper question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and skills rendering him 
capable of combining the prior art references.” Id. at 1368. But see Cottrell, supra note 103, at 616 
(“The Federal Circuit stated that ‘[c]ommon knowledge and common sense,’ even if assumed to derive 
from the [USPTO’s] expertise, do not substitute for evidence of a ‘specific hint or suggestion’ to 
combine prior art.”) (quoting In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 106. Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1370. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
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or a dye process designer who would have some knowledge of 
chemistry.109 Since the patent was directed to a dyeing process that 
involved chemical reactions, the higher level of skill of a dye process 
designer was more appropriate.110 The court used this higher level of skill 
to “predetermine whether an implicit suggestion exist[ed]” in the prior 
art.111 A dye process designer would be able to draw on his or her 
chemistry background to combine prior art references without any explicit 
suggestion to do so.112 In Dystar, the lack of an explicit TSM to combine 
the prior art references did stop the court from finding that the claimed 
invention was obvious.113 The court ultimately held that the claimed 
invention was simply the work of one skilled in the art, but not the work of 
an inventor.114 
C. Current Application of the Non-obviousness Requirement to Gene 
Patents 
1. In re Bell 
In re Bell115 presented the Federal Circuit with the issue of whether a 
prima facie case of obviousness arises for a gene when prior art references 
disclosed the amino acid sequence of the corresponding protein and a 
general method of cloning.116 The claimed invention was directed to DNA 
and RNA sequences encoding human insulin-like growth factors.117 The 
body of relevant prior art contained two articles which disclosed the amino 
acid sequence corresponding to the claimed DNA and RNA sequences and 
a patent which disclosed a method for isolating a gene when at least a 
portion of the amino acid sequence is known.118 Rejecting the claims as 
obvious over the prior art references, the patent examiner reasoned that 
one of ordinary skill in the art would know how to deduce the nucleic acid 
sequence once the amino acid sequence was known and therefore the 
claimed sequences would have been obvious.119 The Board of Patent 
 
 
 109. Id. at 1362. 
 110. Id. at 1362–63. 
 111. Id. at 1370. 
 112. Id. at 1371. 
 113. Id. at 1372. 
 114. Id. at 1371. 
 115. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 116. Id. at 782–83. 
 117. Id. at 782. 
 118. Id. at 783. 
 119. Id. 
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Appeals and Interferences affirmed the rejection despite the lack of 
structural similarity between the nucleic acid sequence and the amino acid 
sequence.120 Instead, the Board found that the correspondence between the 
amino acid and nucleic acid sequences found in the genetic code was 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.121 The Board 
cited a lack of evidence “that one skilled in the art, knowing the amino 
acid sequences of the desired proteins, would not have been able to 
predictably clone the desired DNA sequences without undue 
experimentation.”122  
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, holding 
the claimed DNA and RNA sequences to be non-obvious.123 The court 
began its analysis by looking for some teaching or suggestion in the prior 
art which would allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to arrive at the 
claimed invention.124 While accepting the proposition of In re Dillon125 
that structural similarity126 between chemical compounds may render a 
claimed compound obvious, the court declined to analogize this reasoning 
to the genetic relationship between nucleic acids and amino acids.127 The 
court stated that the genetic relationship would only allow one to 
“hypothesize possible structures” and give one “the potential for obtaining 
that gene.”128 The genetic code could only direct one to the possible 
structures due to the degeneracy of the code.129 Because of the repetition 
within the genetic code, the amino acid sequence disclosed in the prior art 
 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 785. 
 124. Id. at 783. The court stated that “[a] prima facie case of obviousness is established when the 
teachings from the prior art itself would appear to have suggested the claimed subject matter to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. (quoting In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
 125. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The court held that a prima facie case of obviousness is 
established by proving structural similarity between the claimed subject matter and the prior art and by 
showing that the prior art contains some type of motivation to create the claimed subject matter. Id. at 
692–93.  
 126. See generally Chilakamarri, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the inadequacy of examining 
structural similarities of discoveries such as DNA sequences as opposed to inventions, since in a 
discovery the structure is not indicative of what the inventor contributed); Anita Varma & David 
Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the 
Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 68–69 (1996) (arguing that the structural similarity test is 
inappropriate to apply to DNA since minor changes in the structure of DNA can create major changes 
in function and the structure of DNA is not related to structure of proteins or amino acids); Rai, supra 
note 17, at 835–36 (advocating an analytical approach to DNA obviousness involving a recognition 
that DNA is primarily “a carrier of information” rather than a simple chemical compound).  
 127. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 784.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
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could actually have been encoded for by 1036 different nucleotide 
sequences.130 Since only a few of the possible nucleotide sequences were 
being claimed, the prior art would have to contain some kind of suggestion 
as to which of the possible sequences was actually the human gene in 
order for the claimed sequences to be obvious.131  
Additionally, the prior art patent, which taught a method for isolating a 
gene, appeared to teach away from the method used to isolate the claimed 
sequences.132 The reference suggested using a probe based on amino acids 
encoded by unique codons,133 and taught away from using a probe without 
at least four such amino acids, if the total number of nucleotides in the 
probe exceeded fourteen.134 In this case, the applicant used a probe without 
any uniquely encoded amino acids.135 On these findings, the court held 
that there was no teaching or suggestion in the prior art to combine the 
references in a way that would lead to the claimed sequences, and thus, the 
patent examiner failed to establish obviousness.136  
 
 
 130. Id. But see Varma & Abraham, supra note 126, at 73 (arguing that 1036 was likely not an 
accurate estimate and that at the time of Bell cloning procedures had advanced to the point where 
handling such high numbers of possibilities was entirely possible); Rai, supra note 17, at 836–37 
(pointing out that the Federal Circuit did not take into account the fact that practitioners do not simply 
take the amino acid sequence of a protein and work out the DNA sequence directly, but rather, design 
a small probe based on a portion of the amino acid sequence). Additionally, Rai points out that the 
number of possible DNA sequences can be limited by selecting a probe consisting of amino acids 
coded for by only one or two possible codons and by using “codon catalogs,” which provide 
information on species-specific preferences in codon selection. Id. 
 131. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 784. The court made a point to reserve the possibility of finding a gene 
obvious when the amino acid sequence of the encoded protein is known, stating that a gene might be 
obvious if the known amino acid sequence included only amino acids encoded for by a single possible 
codon. Id. The court also explicitly reserved its opinion as to whether a protein might be made obvious 
by knowledge of full structure of the DNA sequence. Id. n.6. 
 132. Id. at 784. But see Brian C. Cannon, Note, Toward a Clear Standard of Obviousness for 
Biotechnology Patents, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 762 (1994) (proposing an obviousness analysis for 
DNA sequence patents focusing on the methods and techniques used rather than on the end product 
because the novelty is based on discovering and isolating a specific DNA sequence rather than 
conceiving a utility for that DNA sequence).  
 133. Unique codons represent the only possible nucleotide triplet for adding a specific amino acid. 
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 134. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 784. But see Varma & Abraham, supra note 126, at 74 (indicating the 
impracticality of selecting only unique codons as only two amino acids, methionine and tryptophan, 
are coded for by unique codons).  
 135. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 784. Bell used a probe consisting of twenty-three nucleotides, or eight 
amino acids. Id.  
 136. Id. at 785. 
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2. In re Deuel 
In re Deuel137 presented the question of whether a prior art reference 
teaching a method of gene isolation could be combined with another 
reference disclosing a partial amino acid sequence to establish a case of 
prima facie obviousness for the DNA and cDNA sequences encoding the 
partially disclosed amino acid sequence.138 Whereas the prior art in Bell 
disclosed the full amino acid sequence of the protein, the prior art in Deuel 
only disclosed the first nineteen amino acids.139  
Deuel claimed isolated and purified DNA and cDNA sequences which 
encoded heparin-binding growth factors (“HBGFs”).140 The prior art 
contained a reference which disclosed a group of similar heparin-binding 
proteins and the first nineteen amino acids of those proteins.141 These 
nineteen amino acids were identical to the first nineteen amino acids in the 
HBGFs.142 The prior art also contained a reference that disclosed a general 
technique of isolating a gene using a gene probe.143 In rejecting the claims, 
the patent examiner stated that it would have been prima facie obvious to 
one of ordinary skill to arrive at the claimed sequences given the prior art 
disclosures of the partial amino acid sequence of similar heparin-binding 
proteins and a gene isolation technique.144 The disclosures would make it 
obvious to use the disclosed partial amino acid sequence to design a probe, 
allowing a person of ordinary skill to isolate the gene.145 The Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the rejection, noting the routine 
nature of gene cloning techniques.146  
 
 
 137. 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 138. Id. at 1557. 
 139. Id. at 1556.  
 140. Id. at 1553–54. 
 141. Id. at 1556. 
 142. Id. at 1156 n.5.  
 143. Id. at 1556. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. See also Ex parte Hudson, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1322, 1324 (1990) (reviewing an obviousness 
rejection for patent claiming a nucleotide sequence).  
[O]nce the amino acid sequence of a known useful protein is known, there is motivation for 
one of ordinary skill in the relevant art to construct a synthetic gene for biosynthesis of that 
protein. Whether or not the specific biosynthesis involved would have been obvious under 35 
U.S.C. § 103 depends on the specific facts in each case, but the critical inquiry is would there 
have been a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the desired goal, applying only the 
knowledge evidenced as being part of the prior art. 
Id. (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 146. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1556–57. 
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The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, finding the claimed 
DNA sequences to be non-obvious in light of the prior art.147 The court 
again focused on the lack of structural similarity148 between known 
chemical compounds and the claimed invention. It discarded the 
possibility of analogizing the requisite chemical structural similarity to the 
relationship the genetic code provides between an amino acid and a 
nucleotide sequence.149 Degeneracy of the genetic code would prevent a 
person of ordinary skill in the art from “contemplat[ing]” a specific 
nucleotide sequence, and “[w]hat cannot be contemplated or conceived 
cannot be obvious.”150  
The court then addressed the Board’s reliance on the routine nature of 
the gene cloning technique used, stating that prior art knowledge of such a 
method was “essentially irrelevant” to the determination of obviousness 
without some suggestion in the prior art of the specific sequences 
claimed.151 Knowledge of the general technique and partial knowledge of 
the protein’s amino acid sequence would not necessarily lead a person of 
ordinary skill in the art to prepare the specific sequence claimed.152 
Although it may have been “obvious to try” to prepare the claimed 
sequences, the actual sequences themselves were not obvious.153 
 
 
 147. Id. at 1560. 
 148. See also Chilakamarri, supra note 9, at 19 (proposing that using a structural analysis for 
DNA sequence patents could lead to awarding patents to those able to perform the most work and 
experimentation rather than those who make a novel contribution to the art). 
 149. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1557–58. The court directly stated that “[t]he genetic code 
relationship between proteins and nucleic acids does not overcome the deficiencies of the cited 
references.” Id. at 1558. 
 150. Id. The court noted the possibility of obviousness of a gene where the protein in question was 
“of sufficiently small size and simplicity” and lacked redundancy of the genetic code. Id. at 1559.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. See also In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing the 
“impermissible” obvious to try standard). 
The admonition that “obvious to try” is not the standard under § 103 has been directed mainly 
at two kinds of error. In some cases, what would have been ”obvious to try” would have been 
to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a 
successful result, where the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were 
critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful. In 
others, what was “obvious to try” was to explore a new technology or general approach that 
seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general 
guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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III. KSR AND A NEW OUTLOOK ON THE NON-OBVIOUSNESS 
DETERMINATION 
A. The Supreme Court’s Decision in KSR v. Teleflex 
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on the Federal Circuit’s 
TSM test and the non-obviousness determination in KSR International Co. 
v. Teleflex, Inc.154 Although the Court did not entirely reject the TSM 
approach to determining obviousness, the Court did admonish the Federal 
Circuit for applying TSM too strictly in the KSR appeal.155 The Federal 
Circuit’s decision that the claims were not obvious was reversed, and the 
case was remanded.156 
At issue in KSR was a single claim of a patent (the “Engelgau patent”) 
for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable car pedal, allowing 
the car’s internal computer to transmit information regarding the position 
of the pedal to the throttle.157 Teleflex was the exclusive licensee of the 
Engelgau patent and brought suit against KSR alleging patent 
infringement.158 In defense, KSR argued that the Engelgau patent was 
invalid for obviousness.159  
There were several relevant prior art references. U.S. Patent No. 
5,010,782 (“Asano”) disclosed a type of pedal that would allow the driver 
to adjust the pedal’s location rather than having to adjust the driver’s seat 
in order to correct the distance between the driver’s foot and the pedal.160 
 
 
 154. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). Other recent Supreme Court cases that 
deal with patent related issues, but are beyond the scope of this Note, include Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007), MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007), Lab. Corp. 
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006), and eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 155. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739. 
 156. Id. at 1746. 
 157. Id. at 1734. Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent reads as follows:  
A vehicle control pedal apparatus comprising: a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle 
structure; an adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm moveable in force and aft 
directions with respect to said support; a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal 
assembly with respect to said support and defining a pivot axis; and an electronic control 
attached to said support for controlling a vehicle system; said apparatus characterized by said 
electronic control being responsive to said pivot for providing a signal that corresponds to 
pedal arm position as said pedal arm pivots about said pivot axis between rest and applied 
positions wherein the position of said pivot remains constant while said pedal arm moves in 
fore and aft direction with respect to said pivot. 
Adjustable Pedal Assembly With Electronic Throttle Control, U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 col.6 l.17-36 
(filed Aug. 22, 2000) (issued May 29, 2001). 
 158. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1735. 
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Asano’s pedal design allowed one of the pedal’s pivot points to remain 
fixed.161 U.S. Patent No. 5,460,061 (“Redding”) disclosed a similar 
adjustable pedal without a fixed pivot point.162 Additionally, the body of 
prior art contained references that disclosed electronic pedal sensors.163 
U.S. Patent No. 5,063,811 (“Smith”) corrected the problem of wear and 
tear on an electronic pedal sensor by placing the sensor on a fixed part of a 
non-adjustable pedal instead of the footpad.164 Finally, U.S. Patent No. 
5,819,593 (“Rixon”) disclosed an adjustable pedal with an electronic pedal 
sensor mounted to the footpad.165 However, Rixon suffered from the wear 
and tear problems that Smith was designed to correct for non-adjustable 
pedals.166 
The district court held that the Engelgau patent claim at issue would 
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, given the body 
of knowledge in the relevant prior art.167 The court proceeded to undertake 
a step-by-step analysis of obviousness under the four-part Graham 
inquiry.168 The prior art discussed above169 was reviewed in determining 
the scope and content of the prior art, and the level of ordinary skill in the 
art was ascertained.170 Next, the court looked to the differences between 
the prior art and the claimed invention.171 Emphasizing that the prior art 
must be considered as a whole and that consideration must be given to 
what the prior art would suggest to a person of ordinary skill in the art,172 
the court found “little difference” between the prior art and the claim at 
issue.173 Specifically, Asano taught the same type of adjustable pedal 
design as the claim at issue aside from the electronic pedal sensor, which 
was also fully disclosed in the prior art.174  
The court did not stop after finding that the elements of the claim at 
issue were disclosed in the prior art; it proceeded to look for some 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art to combine those 
 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1735–36. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1736. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2003) rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 
1727 (2007). 
 168. Id. at 587. 
 169. See supra notes 160–66 and accompanying text. 
 170. Id. at 587–91. 
 171. Id. at 591–95. 
 172. Id. at 591. 
 173. Id. at 592. 
 174. Id. at 592–93. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:209 
 
 
 
 
disclosures to arrive at the claimed invention.175 Given the wear and tear 
problems of the Rixon pedal design, the court found motivation to 
combine the prior art from both the nature of the problem involved and the 
express teaching in Smith.176 While Teleflex did offer evidence of 
commercial success, it did not offer evidence on any other secondary 
considerations.177 Such evidence was insufficient to defeat KSR’s 
evidence of obviousness.178 Ultimately, the district court held that it would 
have been obvious to combine Asano with an electronic pedal sensor 
attached to the fixed pivot point in order to avoid the wear and tear 
problems of Rixon, and granted KSR’s motion for summary judgment.179  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit, in a nonprecedential opinion, vacated 
the grant of summary judgment in favor of KSR, stating that the district 
court erred in not making specific findings of the teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation in the prior art to combine the references to arrive at the 
claimed invention.180 The court provided: 
The reason, suggestion, or motivation to combine [prior art 
references] may be found explicitly or implicitly: (1) in the prior art 
references themselves; (2) in the knowledge of those of ordinary 
skill in the art that certain references, or disclosures in those 
references, are of special interest or importance in the field; or (3) 
from the nature of the problem to be solved, “leading inventors to 
look to references relating to possible solutions to that problem.”181 
Despite the seemingly broad reach of this language, the court went on 
to require a “rigorous application” of TSM as a guard against the 
temptation to view the claims in question through hindsight.182 When the 
district court found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
found it obvious to combine Asano with an electronic pedal sensor 
attached to the fixed pivot point, it erred in not making “specific findings” 
as to where this motivation to combine came from in the prior art.183 The 
district court felt that the combination would have been obvious based on 
the nature of the problem to be solved, yet the Federal Circuit believed 
 
 
 175. Id. at 593. 
 176. Id. at 594. 
 177. Id. at 595–96. 
 178. Id. at 596.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 
1727 (2007). 
 181. Id. at 285 (quoting Ruiz v. A.B. Chance, Co. 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir 2000). 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 288. 
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that the prior art references were directed to solving different problems.184 
A person of ordinary skill would not have found it obvious to combine 
Asano, which the court said was directed to the “constant ratio 
problem,”185 with Smith, which was directed to solving the problem of 
wear and tear.186 Additionally, since Smith was not directed to adjustable 
pedals, the court did not believe that it would adequately address wear and 
tear in such pedals.187 Under the Federal Circuit’s analysis, summary 
judgment was inappropriate, and the case was remanded.188 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address how obviousness is 
determined and how TSM functions as part of that analysis.189 After 
reviewing the prior art and the decisions of the district court and the 
Federal Circuit, the Court began by rejecting the “rigid approach” of the 
Federal Circuit as inconsistent with the more flexible approach advocated 
by previous Supreme Court decisions.190 While there is a requirement for 
courts to provide reasons for the ultimate conclusion on obviousness, those 
reasons do not have to include “precise teachings” in the prior art, for the 
“court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person 
of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”191 The Court stated that TSM 
was not adverse to the Graham framework of obviousness analysis, but 
also referred to TSM as merely a “helpful insight.”192  
 
 
 184. Id.  
 185. The constant ratio problem refers to the problem of guaranteeing that the same amount of 
force will be required when pressing on the pedal, regardless of how the pedal is adjusted. The 
problem was solved by the use of a fixed pivot point on the adjustable pedal. KSR Int’l Co., v. 
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1735, 1738 (2007). 
 186. Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 288–89.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 290. 
 189. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734–35. 
 190. Id. at 1739.  
 191. Id. at 1741. Cf. Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, supra note 14, at 29 (“Requiring the legal determination of obviousness to be based upon 
concrete facts will ensure that courts measuring the prior art and the expertise of a person with 
ordinary skill in the art will not take for granted the difficulties of combining well-known divergent 
elements and methodologies for new uses”). 
 192. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. See also Lee & Butler, supra note 88, at 929 (“The Supreme Court 
Justices seemed to emphasize ambiguities in the TSM test throughout the KSR v. Teleflex oral 
arguments. . . .”). The transcripts of the oral arguments demonstrate the Justices feeling that TSM, in 
its present form, was inadequate in and of itself. See Transcript of Oral Argument, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 
1727, No. 04-1350, 2006 U.S. Trans LEXIS 77. Justice Breyer stated “I’ve read it about 15 or 20 times 
now, I just don’t understand what is meant by the term ‘motivation.’” Id. at 9. When Mr. Goldstein, on 
behalf of Teleflex, said “I think you can’t understand what motivation means and what the whole test 
that the Federal Circuit is employing means—”, Justice Scalia interrupted to quip, “You’re right about 
that.” Id. at 28. As Goldstein continued to attempt to explain the distinction between motivation and 
teaching and suggestion, he said, “Justice Breyer, you don’t understand,” to which Justice Breyer 
admitted, “That’s true.” Id. at 31. Justice Scalia later on went so far as to say, “You say its test is 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
232 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:209 
 
 
 
 
The Court assigned four crucial errors to the Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning.193 First, the Federal Circuit erred in limiting courts and 
examiners to only reviewing the problem that the patentee was trying to 
solve.194 Even if the patentee was only concerned with finding a solution 
to a single problem, the obviousness determination is based not on what 
was obvious to the patentee, but what would have been obvious to one of 
ordinary skill in the art.195 One of ordinary skill in the art would be aware 
of other problems existing in the field, and these other problems could 
provide the necessary motivation to combine prior art references.196  
Second, the Federal Circuit erred in assuming that one of ordinary skill 
trying to solve a problem in the field would only look to prior art 
references which address the same problem.197 The Court stated that 
“[c]ommon sense teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses 
beyond their primary purposes” and emphasized that the hypothetical 
person of ordinary skill in the art must be afforded a level of common 
sense and creativity.198  
Third, the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that a claim can never be 
shown to be obvious when it is shown that the combination of prior art 
references making up the claim would have been obvious to try.199 The 
Court reasoned: 
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem 
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a 
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known 
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the 
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of 
ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a 
 
 
inclusive. I would say its test is meaningless.” Id. at 36. Even Chief Justice Roberts agreed, arguing 
that the test was “worse than meaningless.” Id. at 40.  
 193. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. See also Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 81, at 12 (“There was apparently no room for the possibility that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art might find it obvious to apply prior art technology to a problem slightly 
different from the problem articulated in the prior art references”). 
 198. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. See also Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 81, at 12 (“This approach limits the role of the PHOSITA 
to that of a sort of reference librarian, who can locate appropriate prior art references but is apparently 
incapable of applying or recombining them with even a modicum of creativity in light of his or her 
knowledge and skill.”). 
 199. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. 
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combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious 
under § 103.200 
Finally, the Federal Circuit erred by holding that the risk of hindsight 
bias must be addressed by a strict adherence to finding specific teachings 
in the prior art which provide motivation to combine.201 The Court held 
that such a strict adherence was unnecessary and would in fact lead to a 
denial of “recourse to common sense.”202 After reviewing these errors, the 
Court agreed with the district court’s initial holding that the claim in 
question was obvious.203 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Application of KSR 
In decisions handed down subsequent to KSR, the Federal Circuit has 
indicated it will now handle the non-obvious determination. Although the 
Federal Circuit has yet to address the question of obviousness of patents 
claiming DNA sequences of a protein when the amino acid sequence is 
known, analysis of its post-KSR decisions addressing other technologies is 
helpful in predicting how the Federal Circuit will handle such a case.  
In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc.204 addressed the problem of 
combining prior art references absent an explicit suggestion to make such 
a combination.205 The patent at issue claimed a treadmill with a folding 
base to allow for easier storage.206 The obviousness rejection was based on 
two prior art references, with the conflict focused on the folding 
mechanism.207 The court paid close attention to the similarity between the 
problems to be solved by the prior art references and the patent in 
question.208 Even without an express suggestion to combine the two 
references, the court still found a sufficient rationale for the argument that 
a person having ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine 
 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 1742–43. See also Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 81, at 22 (arguing that requiring specific proof of a suggestion in the 
prior art may be untenable since practitioners are unlikely to publish common knowledge; if it obvious 
to practitioners in the field to combine prior art references, that information is unlikely to ever be 
published). 
 203. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743. 
 204. 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 205. Id. at 1377–78. 
 206. Id. at 1377. 
 207. Id. at 1380–81. 
 208. Id. at 1381. 
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the references.209 Although In re Icon dealt with technology unrelated to 
gene patents, it does show that the Federal Circuit is taking seriously the 
Supreme Court’s demand that TSM is to be applied more leniently.210 
Since KSR, the Federal Circuit has had the opportunity to address 
obviousness in several cases dealing with chemical compound patent 
claims.211 In Takeda Chemical Industries v. Alphapharm, the patent in 
question claimed pioglitazone, a chemical compound for the treatment of 
diabetes.212 Although the prior art did not disclose pioglitazone, a 
reference did disclose over one hundred chemical compounds, including 
compound b, a structurally similar compound to pioglitazone but which 
would require two modifications to arrive at the claimed compound.213 
Additionally, the prior art reference did not identify compound b as a 
promising line of interest.214 The court determined that pioglitazone was 
not obvious, and provided a helpful insight to their analysis.215 The court 
stated that “[r]ather than identify predictable solutions for antidiabetic 
treatment, the prior art disclosed a broad selection of compounds, any one 
of which could have been selected as a lead compound for further 
investigation.”216 Further, the court pointed to the prior art’s teaching away 
from choosing compound b.217 This was not the situation, in the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion, that the Supreme Court had envisioned when it stated 
that a determination of obviousness might flow from a finding that the 
claimed invention was obvious to try.218 While the prior art in Takeda 
disclosed a wide array of possible solutions for antidiabetic treatment, the 
genetic code provides a “predictable solution” when attempting to 
determine the DNA sequence for a known amino acid sequence. Rather 
than a wide array of possibilities, only a limited number of DNA 
sequences would have to be considered.  
The Federal Circuit also addressed the obviousness of a chemical 
compound in Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin, Ltd.219 There, 
 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. at 1380 (“Indeed, ‘any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of 
invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner 
claimed.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742). 
 211. See Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Aventis 
Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 212. Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1353. 
 213. Id. at 1357–58. 
 214. Id. at 1358. 
 215. Id. at 1364. 
 216. Id. at 1359. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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the court made two statements of significant interest. First, the court stated 
that “it is sufficient to show that the claimed and prior art compounds 
possess a ‘sufficiently close relationship . . . to create an expectation,’ in 
light of the totality of the prior art, that the new compound will have 
‘similar properties’ to the old”.220 If the Federal Circuit insists on treating 
DNA as a chemical compound in its analysis, it should both recognize the 
close relationship between DNA and amino acids and how that 
relationship functions in the creation of a protein. Second, the court 
commented that “isolation of interesting compounds [from a mixture] is a 
mainstay of the chemist’s art” and should not be regarded as an invention 
worthy of protection.221 It will be hard for the Federal Circuit, if it evenly 
evaluates the level of skill in biotechnology, to state that while it may not 
be innovation for a chemist to isolate a compound from a mixture, it 
somehow rises to the level of patent-worthy inventive genius for a 
biologist or geneticist, already knowing the amino acid sequence, to 
determine the DNA sequence. 
IV. APPLYING KSR  
Since the Court’s KSR decision did not set forth a new test for 
obviousness, the actual effect of the decision is hard to predict. The Court 
explicitly endorsed using both the Graham factors and TSM to determine 
whether a patent claim is invalid due to obviousness over the prior art.222 
However, the Court firmly reprimanded the Federal Circuit for applying 
TSM in too strict a fashion.223 Recent Federal Circuit decisions have 
demonstrated that the court is taking seriously the instruction that TSM is 
to be applied more flexibly.224 While the Federal Circuit has not yet had 
the opportunity to readdress the obviousness of a DNA sequence patent for 
a gene where the full amino acid sequence has already been disclosed in 
the prior art, this issue is likely to reappear in light of KSR.225  
 
 
 220. Id. at 1301 (quoting In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir 1990)). 
 221. Id. at 1302. 
 222. KSR Int’l Co., v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007). 
 223. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 204–21 and accompanying text. 
 225. However, the USPTO has heard an appeal based on an obviousness rejection for a patent 
claiming a polynuecleotide sequence. Ex Parte Kubin, Appeal 2007-0819, 2007 WL 2070495 (Bd. 
Pat. App. & Interf. May 31, 2007). The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences stated the issue as 
“[w]ould Appellants’ claimed nucleotide sequence have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the 
art, based on [prior art] disclosure of p38 [the same protein that was being claimed] and [prior art] 
express teachings how to isolate its cDNA by conventional techniques?” Id. at *2. While the protein 
itself was disclosed in the prior art, its sequence was not disclosed, but could easily have been obtained 
through routine methodologies. Id. at *3. Further, the prior art disclosed the mouse version of the 
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A. Applying KSR to Gene Patents 
The Supreme Court provided several distinct opportunities for the 
Federal Circuit to interpret KSR in ways which would allow or even 
require a determination of obviousness for a patent claiming a DNA 
sequence of a gene when the amino acid sequence of the encoded protein 
has already been disclosed in the prior art. First, while reviewing United 
States v. Adams,226 a companion case to Graham, the Court stated that 
“when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is 
altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the 
field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.”227 
Adams dealt with a patent claim that substituted one known type of battery 
electrode for another.228 At the time of Adams, biotechnology had not 
entered the world of patents, yet the principle articulated there can easily 
be extrapolated and applied to gene patents. If one considers a known 
amino acid sequence as the structure already known in the art, and the 
substitution of codons for each amino acid via the genetic code as the 
substitution of one element for another known in the field, the resulting 
DNA sequence ought to be regarded as an obvious, predictable result. Due 
to the degeneracy of the genetic code, the substitution may not be as 
simple as a one-to-one relationship. However, the principle is the same. 
Second, the Court discussed the situation where a problem is identified 
in a field and has only a certain number of possible solutions.229 If a person 
having ordinary skill in the art were to try these possible solutions and 
come up with nothing more than a foreseeable result, then a thing has not 
been invented so much as it has resulted from the interplay between 
common sense and ordinary skill in the art.230 The Court then explicitly 
provided an opportunity for the “obvious to try” doctrine to have a place in 
the obviousness determination in those particular circumstances.231  
 
 
protein and the mouse version’s nucleotide sequence. Id. The Board argued that Deuel was not 
controlling due to the factual differences and the significant advances in the field since the Deuel 
decision. Id. The Board also noted that KSR “cast doubt on the viability of Deuel to the extent the 
Federal Circuit rejected an ‘obvious to try’ test.” Id. at *5 (citing KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727). To this end, 
the Board proposed that it might be more able to utilize an “obvious to try” standard than previously 
thought. Id. at *5. 
 226. 383 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 227. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740. 
 228. Id.  
 229. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 230. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. 
 231. Id. Contra In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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Since the Court’s language was broadly worded, the principles flowing 
from the overall decision can once again easily be applied to gene patents. 
Guided by the genetic code, one can see how, given a full amino acid 
sequence for a known protein, there are only a finite number of possible 
DNA sequences which would code for that specific protein.232 For each 
individual amino acid, there are only a certain number of codons that will 
add that specific amino acid to the growing protein.233 As the number of 
possibilities grows, the time required to explore each of those possibilities 
also grows; however, it is still within the realm of a biotechnology 
PHOSITA’s skill to make the attempt.234 While it would certainly require 
a dedicated work ethic, the work of trying these known possibilities is not 
the type of invention meant to be rewarded by patent protection.235  
Finally, the Court’s opinion is laced with admonitions to apply TSM 
more flexibly and allow fact-finders to use a PHOSITA’s common sense 
in making the obviousness determination.236 Biotechnology is one of the 
fields that many commentators have recognized has been subjected to a 
much stricter determination of obviousness than other fields.237 Use of 
common sense to provide a suggestion or motivation to combine certain 
prior art references absent an explicit teaching to do so is not necessarily 
an allowance of hindsight bias.238 While hindsight bias still must be 
avoided, courts must allow the hypothetical PHOSITA to resort to 
common sense in “[fitting] the teachings of multiple [prior art references] 
together like pieces of a puzzle.”239 
B. Overruling In re Bell 
In re Bell still governs the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the 
obviousness of a patent claiming a DNA sequence of a gene was obvious 
when the amino acid sequence of the protein encoded by that gene had 
already been disclosed in the prior art.240 However, the Supreme Court’s 
 
 
 232. The Federal Circuit has already recognized the possibility of finding patent claims for DNA 
sequences obvious if the protein is of a sufficiently small size. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 
(Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 233. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 130 for Rai’s discussion of the use of codon catalogs. 
 235. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741 (“Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the 
ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining 
previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.”).  
 236. See supra notes 190–203 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 238. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742–43.  
 239. Id. at 1742. 
 240. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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decision in KSR and the principles therein demand the reversal of Bell. 
First, the Court restated the premise that substituting one known element 
for another which produced a predictable outcome would result in a 
finding of obviousness.241 Given the full amino acid sequence already 
known in Bell, the DNA sequence claimed in the patent was merely a 
substitute. The genetic code provides a reliable and predictable 
relationship between amino acids and DNA. Each amino acid could easily 
be substituted by a codon, each codon simply being a set of three 
nucleotides. Thus, under KSR, the DNA sequence of the gene encoding the 
protein would have been a relatively simple substitution of one element for 
another known in the field of biotechnology, and therefore, obvious and 
unpatentable. 
Further, Bell represents the situation envisioned by the Court when a 
problem has only a certain number of possible solutions.242 Each amino 
acid of the protein encoded for by the gene claimed in Bell could only be 
encoded for by, at most, six different codons. Provided with the genetic 
code, any biotechnology PHOSITA would have been fully capable of 
determining the limited number of possible DNA sequences that would 
result in the amino acid sequence known in Bell. This is the type of 
common sense that the Court demanded be taken into account when 
making the obviousness determination.243 Once that limited number of 
possibilities had been determined, it would have been obvious to try each 
possibility until arriving at the true DNA sequence. 
C. Maintaining In re Deuel 
While KSR mandates the reversal of In re Bell, the Federal Circuit 
should maintain the holding of In re Deuel. Unlike Bell, only a partial 
amino acid sequence had been disclosed in the prior art in Deuel.244 The 
transition from this partial amino acid sequence to the nucleotide sequence 
claimed in the patent was not mere substitution. While it may have been 
feasible to substitute the possible DNA sequences for the known portion of 
the amino acid sequence, only nineteen amino acids in the sequence had 
been disclosed.245 A further inventive step was required to arrive at the full 
DNA sequence of the gene. Additionally, the known partial amino acid 
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 244. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See supra Part II.C.2. 
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sequence did not provide a limited number of possible solutions. It would 
only be possible to predict the possible DNA sequences for the known 
amino acid portion of the protein. The claimed DNA sequence contained 
the gene which encoded for a protein with a sequence of 168 amino 
acids.246 There was no feasible way to predict the possible DNA sequence 
corresponding with the remaining 149 unknown amino acids. The Federal 
Circuit was correct in holding that a patent claiming a DNA sequence of a 
gene was warranted when only a partial amino acid sequence of the 
protein encoded by the gene was known in the prior art. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit should overrule Bell and hold that a DNA sequence 
is obvious when the entire amino acid sequence of the protein of interest is 
known in the prior art. The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR, advances in 
the field of biotechnology, and the simple relationship between amino 
acids and DNA sequences all point to such a conclusion. The structural 
similarity standard can no longer be applied in a workable fashion to DNA 
patents.247 Deuel, however, presents a slightly different situation where 
only a portion of the amino acid sequence was known. In such a case, 
there is not a predetermined, finite set of potential DNA sequences. A 
researcher provided only with a partial amino acid sequence must still 
utilize more than simple common sense in discovering the full DNA 
sequence. Given the differences between Bell and Deuel, one can be 
overruled without affecting the precedent set by the other.248 The patent 
system will be strengthened by reaffirming the maxim that only those 
 
 
 246. Id. at 1555. 
 247. Compare Natalie A. Lissy, Note, Patentability of Chemical and Biotechnology Inventions: A 
Discrepancy in Standards, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069, 1094–95 (2003) (proposing that the Federal 
Circuit continue to follow precedent set in chemical compound cases in order to maintain consistency 
and predictability), with Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 7, at 144 (proposing that the Federal Circuit 
require gene patent applicants to sequence a complete gene, or enough of the gene to enable one to 
determine its function and preliminary diagnostic uses). 
 248. However, not all commentators believe the revision of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of 
DNA patents should stop at Bell. See Wegner, supra note 19, at 459–60 (“It may be expected that in 
the wake of KSR, there will be a renewed challenge to the viability of the holding of Deuel.”). Even 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences asserts that the Deuel holding is questionable after KSR. 
Ex Parte Kubin, Appeal 2007-0819, at *5, 2007 WL 2070495 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. May 31, 2007). 
One commentator has gone further, believing that KSR calls for a change in not only the obviousness 
test, but also disclosure requirements. Laakmann supra note 14, at 72. Laakmann argues that such 
changes will push biotechnology patents downstream, meaning that patents will be directed to “more 
direct clinical applications” rather than “basic genomics discoveries.” Id. 
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inventions representing a non-obvious advance of the prior art should be 
awarded patent protection.  
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